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1. Introduction 
~ ... '. ~ (. . I' : 
Perhaps because of Pakistan's (Henderson, 1993) pursuit of nuclear 
capability, increased attention has focused on that country's pattern of 
defense expenditures. Because of the high proportion of the budget devoted 
to defense, the economic impact of these expenditures has also been of 
concern. How rapidly do Pakistani defense expenditures respond to increased 
Indian allocations to the military? Are the opportunity costs (in terms of 
foregone output and income) likely to constrain that country's military 
budget? · · · 
To date, preliminary research has produced several counterintuitive 
findings (Looney, 1991, 1995): 
1. It appears that Pakistan's defense expenditures cannot merely be said 
to occur in response to Indian militancy. While this may have been true 
in the early years after independence, there is little evidence that this 
relationship any longer exists. In fact there appears to be a fairly close 
link between defense expenditures and the overall size of the economy. 
2. The apparent negative impact of defense expenditures on the rate of 
growth in real Gross Domestic Product (especially in the 1958-73 
period) may have stemmed from an overreaction to Indian defense 
expenditures. The net result was to compress military allocations into 
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too narrow a period. The net result was to impair an efficient transfer of 
resources from the civilian sector. 
3. During periods when Pakistan's defense expenditures are not simply a 
reaction to Indian defense expenditures, allocations to the military 
appear to have a (albeit weak) positive effect on economic growth. In 
addition it was found that during this period defense expenditures were 
expanded in line with the general expansion of the economy. 
These patterns suggest that during periods when Pakistan does not have to 
structure its defense spending to counter that of India's, the country could 
expand allocations to the military in line with its resource base. The net result 
reduces somewhat the negative influences on the economy. While plausible, 
this explanation does not explain why defense expenditures have had a 
positive effect on GDP in recent years. 
One possible explanation may lie in the manner in which the government 
times its allocations to the military. Several studies (Griffin, Wallace and 
Devine, 1982; Treddenick, 1985; and Looney, 1991a) have found that 
positive links between defense and the economy are often a result of 
"Military Keynesianism" effects (Cf. Whynes, 1979). Specifically, since 
defense is one item of the budget on which the government may have 
considerable discretionary control, expenditures on the military can often be 
used to stabilize the economy. That is these expenditures may increase during 
periods of downturn and decrease when inflationary pressures build up. 
The purpose of the analysis below is to extend the earlier Military 
Keynesian analysis developed in this Journal (Looney, 1991a). That study 
used cross section analysis and as such was not able to identify many of the 
shorter run dynamic adjustments that may characteriz.e the relationship 
between defense expenditures and the main macroeconomic aggregates. 
Drawing on the findings of that study and using time series data for Pakistan 
the main questions addressed are: whether defense expenditures have 
responded to economic conditions and if so has this response been to offset 
fluctuations in GDP and/or inflationary pressures? Has the pattern and timing 
of defense expenditures been fundamentally different from that of non-
defense allocations and if so in what manner? 
2. BackgrowuJ , . • 
Most of the literature on Military Keynesianism has focused on defense 
expenditures in the developed countries. For example, (Griffin, Wallace and 
Devine, 1982) examined defense spending patterns in the United States 
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bet\veen 1949 and 1976 and concluded. that: "military outlays (as a 
percentage '.of GNP) do appear to be employed as a counter-cyclical fiscal 
instrument ·by· the state". However, in a more recent study (Looney and 
Mehay, 1990) it was found. that these effects may have weakened 
considerably in recent years. ,' •,!i ·''!i'\ i 
~, · · In the case of Canada, Treddenick ( 1985) attempted to: . . :1.· • , 
r:: pUrstl~ 'otti pamcular line of thinking about military expenditiires: namely, that 
" the' lever.· and composition of a nation's"'lllilitary expendifures may be 
significantly influenced by domestic economic imperatives whicp are 
11 )p.dependep.t of any security considerations. Thus, military expenditures may be 
·.undertaken to promote economic objectives, but rationalized in terms of 
·:n providing for riatlonal security: · · "' • ""; ·" . 
r!trTreddenick .. concluded ~at large increases in Canadian defense 
expenditures have been influenced more by economic than security 
considerations.·:.:: 
'.· 1 O'Leary, and. Coplin (197 5) suggested that the following factors might 
influence defense spending patterns in Latin America: 
: ,: ,1. Economic condition of the country; g 1 i:i;i ' , ~ ; : 
·2. role of the military in non-military affairs; ~ 1 ·~l·~ ! :r;·· 
3. internal security needs; · '": 
4. arms races; 
5. military budgets in rival states; 
6. internal political support; .· :··~ 1 ::: .,; 
.. .?..;. age, structure of existing equipment. , 
The only apparent correlation was between the military budget and arms 
races.and the budget levels in rival states. Apparently, both of these factors 
acted as a reference point "from which individual countries might set their 
own budget levels". 
· · Maizels and Nissanke (1986) attempted to quantify the major factors that 
have influenced military spending in 83 countries. They developed a 
coricepfual ·matrix that distinguished between domestic,' regional and global 
coD.tlicts' on the one hand, and three potential fufluences on military 
expenditures (political framework, economic linkages~ and military a9tiyify) 
on the .o~er. Their model was then applied for the sample countries,~, a 
\\'libt~; md for separate regions ,of Africa, Asia, and L~tin America.1,Th~µ. 
nihln findings were that (Maizels and Nissanke, 1986, pp. 1137): ·· · · ·· 
\r: .... 
\·,:· The differences among developing countries in the .relative size of their 
:,·military burdens ... appear to reflect a complex of factors - domestic, regional 
and global - which are not easy to disentangle and which no doubt vary in 
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emphasis from country to country .... Domestic factors, particularly the need· 
perceived by ruling elites to repress .internal opposition groups, and external 
facto~, incJuding relations with the global power blocks and the availability of . 
. foreign exchange to purchase arms from abroad, also appear to be maj_or 
determinants of government decisions in regard to military expenditures. .. ' • . 
In another major study, Harris (1986) attempted to measure the effect of 
domestic econqOO,~ conditions ~ce the early 1960s on military budge~ in 
five ASEAN co.1Jlltries: lnd<;>nesia, Malaysia, Philippines, SingaP9re . ~d 
Thailand. His main findings were that: :1·;·: ,. ; :: :7 .. ;::;· 
1. Defense' exJ)enditures in; th~. current year·. are P()~i~vely: co~~IA~ With 
both defense spending and the· central , bUdge~' posi~oii' ·in the 
. .· • ' •. ' ! ·. ; ~ (.~· •, ' . ' • • 
. previous year. 
·:·~. · 2. Current defense expenditures have a; :weak inverse· correlation· With 
.,:, ... inflation in the previous year. "•11:. ,: , · 
3. Alth,ough current defense budgets are not correlated with the balance of 
rri· . : payments in the previous year, the ·.balance· of payments affects 
· government revenue which in turn affects defense spending. 
David Denoon (1986) also examined defense expenditures in the ASEAN 
region and offered several theoretical explanations for their distinctive 
patterns: 
1. Governments respond to actual military threats. 
2. Domestic political concerns determine recruiting, the . stationing of 
troops and levels of readiness. · . . . 
3. Resources allocated to defense are determined through the 'government 
, ~ .. system.~._·; · · " .:·1 
· 4. Militaty.:industrial complexes view for shares of the defense budget:·:rns: 
5. Arms races affect military budgets. r,-;1:.~ 
. , ~an extension of the- Harris paper, LQoney and Fredenksen (1988) ~ed 
:~~ .. ~e~~s, da~ ; to examine ,the economical . de,tt;rminants of. defense 
e~ditures for,.t~n. Latin American countries: Argentina, Peru, .Mexico, 
\reiie~ela, .'Chile,~,P,araguay. ·u~~, Colombia~ Brazil and EcWui0r. :'.F<>4f 
.alterµative models were tested. Jhe mdependent variables were current.and 
Jagge4 .values of Qffi>, govenmient expendittire, and military exp~tJ.di~s . 
. Tu~~ main tindin8S ';Vere that much of the vapabilify in defense ew~nclj~s 
Cari be explained by ecorio~c variables:· the overall cqnstraining:qor.;§a 
fiscal funding variables. ' · · · · · i,i.L • '" • 
Finally a study of defense expenditures in South East Asia (Uooney and 
Frederiksen, 1990) tested a "Military Keynesian" model to determine the 
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extent to which defense expenditures had been used as tools for economic 
stabilization. Three basic patterns were found: stabilization or "Military 
Keynesianism" (Singapore), augmentation (increased expenditures with 
unexpected increases in resources (Malaysia), and distributed lags-increases 
in defense expenditures over time as a result of an expanding domestic 
economy (Philippines). In all countries that increased defense budgets as 
expected GNP increased. There were, however, significant variations 
between countries as to the timing of increased allocations to the military. 
Specifically, Thailand exhibited a weak stabilization pattern. Korean defense 
expenditures followed the long run distributed lag function, although as in the 
case of Thailand there was a weak stabilization effect. 
3. The Stabilization Model 
While the study noted above provides a useful start in assessing the 
manner in which countries may use defense expenditures as a stabilization 
tool, various economic problems arise in attempting to measure this counter-
cyclical relationship. 
Some or all of the variables involved could exhibit non-stationary 
tendencies. Also, high R2 values may arise as a result of correlated trends and 
not through economic relationships. The standard method of overcoming this 
problem is to see whether the relationship discovered in levels persists after 
first differencing. The problem with such an approach is that it involves the 
loss of low frequency (long-run) information. The assertion that there is a 
long run relationship between defense expenditures and the level of economic 
activity in Pakistan necessitates the use of an econometric methodology that 
overcomes the problem of spurious regressions. 
In this regard, cointegration and Error Correction Modeling (ECM) allow 
the identification of non-spurious relationships without forcing the loss of 
long-run information. Moreover, ECM allows for suitable economic 
interpretations since it incorporates equilibrium relationships as suggested by 
economic theory, along with the possibility of variables responding to short-
run disequilibrium. The concept of cointegration provides the link between 
integrated processes and the concept of equilibrium. It was originally 
developed by Granger ( 1981) and extended by Engle and Granger ( 1987). 
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4. Cointegration-Error Correction Tests 
More formally, if x; and Yi are both nonstationary in levels, but stationary 
in the first differences, they are said to be integrated of order one, denoted by 
I( 1 ). If x; and Yi are both I( 1 ), their linear combinations of the form z, = x; -
a.Yi are generally also I(l). However, if there is an a. such that Z1 is integrated 
of order zero or I(O), the linear combination of x; and Yi is stationary, and the 
two variables are said to be cointegrated. 
Engle and Granger (1987) propose several ways of testing for 
cointegration. In this paper we use the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) 
(ADF) test because it has good power properties for first-order and higher-
order systems. The ADF test of cointegration consists of first performing the 
following cointegration regression: 
(1) x; =co+ c1Yi +e, 




e, - E1-1 = lJie,_1 + L ( E1-1 - Et-1-1) + µ, 
1=1 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is Ho: b1 = 0. If the null is rejected, 
x; and Yi are cointegrated. 
The cointegration relation x; - a.Yi = 0 represents a long-term equilibrium 
relation between x; and Yi. and the cointegration factor z, can be used to 
measure the deviation from this long-term relation. Engle and Granger (1987) 
suggest estimating the value of a. by performing the following regression: 
(3) 
By knowing a.i, the cointegration factor Z1 can be obtained from 
(4) 
. 
Engle and Granger ( 1987) combine the concept of causality in the Granger 
sense and the notion of cointegration to develop a model that allows testing 
for both short-term and long-term relations between two time series. The 
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model is the ECM. The following ECM investigates the potential long- and 
short-term effects of X on Y: 
m m 
(5) Y,-Y,_1 =a0 +a1Z1-1 + L);(X1_ 1-X1-1-i)Lc/Y,-J -r,_1_1)+E1 
i=l j=I 
The ECM of the above equation decomposes the dynamic adjustments of 
the dependent variable Y into two components. The first is a long-term 
component given by the cointegration term 
also known as the error correction term. The correction adjustments of Yi to a 
disequilibrium error from the previous period Z,.1 can be spread over several 
periods, with the coefficient a1 indicating the speed of the correction 
mechanism. The second component is a short-term component given by the 
summation terms on the right-hand side of equation (5). These two terms 
represent past changes in X and Y and characterize the short-term dynamics. 
Specifically, the first summation tenn in equation (5) gives the short-term 
effect of X on Y. 
Similarly, the following ECM expresses the long- and short-term effects of 
YonX: 
m m 
(6) x, -x,_1 =a0 +a1Z,_1 + L<l>1(f,_,-f,_;_1)LO/X,_1 -X,_1_1)+µ, 
1=1 j=I 
From equations (5) and (6) it follows that X, and Yi are cointegrated when 
at least one of the coefficients a 1 or a 1 is different from zero. In this case, X, 
and Y, exhibit long-tenn comovements. When a1 is different from zero but a 1 
is zero, Y, follows and adjusts to X, in the long term. The opposite occurs 
when a 1 is different from zero but a1 is zero. When both coefficients, a1 and 
a 1 are different from zero, a feedback exists and the two variables adjust to 
one another over the long term. 
The coefficients bi's and <!>i's represent the short-tenn relation between X, 
and Y,. When b1' s are not all zero but all <j>1' s are zero, Xis leading or causing 
Yin the short term. The reverse is true when <l>i' s are not all zero but all bi's 
are zero. When both events occur, a feedback exists and the two variables 
affect each other in the short term. 
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A key issue in error correction cointegration analysis is the specification of 
an optimal lag structure for the autoregressive model (the author is indebted 
to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach). Here we have used 
the (ARDL) procedure developed by Pesaran w;id Pesaran (1997). Essentially 
the procedure begins with the selection of a fairly long lag period. The 
Schwartz Bayesian criterion is then used to determine the optimal lag pattern. 
The program then provides estimates of the error correction model (ECM) 
which corresponds to the selected ARDL model. 
'1, ,' . ~~1.;: .,lf { 'it-f~1t•.; .. ·," ", ;.!f', 
. ~ •, • \ i ) .. 
5. Results 
The ADF tests of the key variables in the system: Gross Domestic Product 
(GDPNP), inflation (GDPDF), as proxied by the GDP detlator, total 
government expenditures (GEP); military expenditures (MILXP) and non 
military expenditures (NILXP) indicated that these variables, were non-
.stationary in their levels but stationary in their first differences. In addition to 
these vai;iables .a structural shift dummy (DUM3), representing the period 
before and after the break up of East and West Pakistan (0, 1960-1971; l, 
1972-1995) was added to the analysis to capture possible changes in 
budgetary priorities associated with the splitting up of the pountry and. or 
wars with. India. All of the variables except the GDP detlator are in. 1995 
constant prices. 
The error-correction cointegration analysis (ARDL) was first undertaken 
for the period as a whole (1960-1996), and each of.the three major categories 
of government expenditures, Total government expenditures (GEP), Defense 
expenditures (MILXP), and Non-defense (NILXP) expenditures (Table 1): 
1. A common pattern characterizes the long-run relationship between the 
various types of government expenditures and the macroeconomy. As 
evidenced by the statistical significance of the error correction term 
( ecm-1 ), a long run relationship exists for each of the major categories 
of government expenditures. Specifically it implies that government 
expenditures are cointegrated with Gross Domestic Product . and the 
GDP detlator .. 
2. In addition, the negative sign on the error correction term implies that 
if government expenditures are above their equilibrium level ·they will 
decline. This is what would be expected if during periods of rapid 
economic growth they overshoot their long run equilibrium. On the 
other _hand if they are below their long run equilibrium, there is 
apparently political pressure for expanded fiscal allo~ations. 
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Table 1. Pakistan: ARDL cointegration analysis, error correction representation, 1960-95 
Dependent Variable: Total Government Expenditures (GEP) 
R~essor Coefficient Standard Error T-Rati~ 
GDPDF 77.915 53.738 1.44~.159_1 
GDPNP 0.294 0.046 6.357[.ooO] 
DUM3 -4.692 3.373 -1.391(.176] 
INPT -41.526 7.432 -5.58'[000} 
ecm(-1) -0.697 0.129 -5.380[.000] 
ARDL(l,1,0,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
GEP= GEP-GEP(-1); GDPDF= GDPDF-GDPDF(-1); GDPNP= GDPNP-GDPNP(-1) 
DUM3 = DUM3-DUM3(-1); INPT= INPT-INPT(-1) 
ecm = GEP + 103.8395*GDPDF- .42289*GDPNP + 6.7295*DUM3 + 59.5510*INPT 
R-Squared"' 0.675; R-Bar-Squared = 0.613; F-stat. = 13.543[.000] 
Dependent Variable: Defense Expenditures (MILXP) 
R~essor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio~ 
MILXPl 0.385 0.138 2.789[.010] 
GDPDF -62.982 13.664 -4.609(.000] 
GDP NP 0.064 0.015 4.245[ooQI 
DUM3 3.104 0.928 3.345[.ooj] 
INPT -5.260 2.055 -2.559(.0171 
ecm(-1) -0.683 0.137 -4.981[.000] 
ARDL(2,1,0,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
MILXP = MILXP-MILXP(-1 ); MILXPl = MILXP(-1) -MJLXP(-2); 
GDPDF= GDPDF-GDPDF(-1); GDPNP= GDPNP-GDPNP(-1); 
DUM3 = DUM3-DUM3(-1); INPT= INPT-INPT(-1) 
ecm = MILXP + 13.614*GDPDF- .094*GDPNP - 4.541*DUM3+1.695*INPT 
R-Squared = 0.685; R-Bar-Squared = 0.610; F-Statistic = 10.898(.000] 
Dependent Variable: Non-Defense Expenditures (NJLXP) 
R~essor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio(Probf 
GDPDF 135.840 57.760 2.351f.026}_ 
GDP NP 0.213 0.041 5.205[.000] 
DUM3 -7.295 3.924 -1.858(.074] 
INPT -34.156 7.385 -4.624[.00Ql 
ecm(-1) -0.647 0.141 -4.565(.000] 
ARDL(l,l,0,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
NJLXP=NILXP-NILXP(-1); GDPDF= GDPDF-GDPDF(-1); 
GDPNP = GDPNP-GDPNP(-1 ); DUM3 = DUM3 -DUMJ(-1 ); INPT = INPT- INPT(-1) 
ecm = NILXP + 90.855*GDPDF- 0.329*GDPNP + 11.263*DUM3 + 52.136*INPT 
R-Squared = 0.606; R-Bar-Squared = 0.531; F-stat. F(4, 27) 10.0371[.000] 
608 ROBERT E. LOONEY 
3. Considerably more variation characterizes the manner in which each 
category of expenditures adjusts to shorter run movements in GDP and 
inflation. Specifically total expenditures do not appear to react to 
inflationary pressure, whereas defense expenditures decline with 
increases in inflation. In contrast non-defense expenditures increase in 
line with price increases. 
4. Another source of variation is associated with the break in the data 
around 1971172, depicted by the dummy variable DUM3. For total 
expenditures, this term is not statistically significant. However it is 
positive and significant for defense expenditures and negative and 
significant (at the 90% level) for non-defense expenditures. Apparently, 
ceteris paribus, governments after 1971 were more inclined to spend on 
defense, and less on non-defense. 
Tentatively these results suggest that for stabiliz.ation purposes the 
Gov~ent of Pakistan distinguishes between the two broad categories of 
government expenditure, defense and non-defense. Furthermore, the 
authorities appear more willing to use defense expenditures as a counter-
cyclical tool, but here largely to offset inflationary pressures rather than 
fluctuations in real output. These budgetary patterns may have become 
stronger over time, especially after the breakup of the country in the early 
1970s. 
As a next step in the analysis, separate tests were undertaken for an earlier 
(1960-80) and later (1975-1995) twenty year interval. In part, the purpose of 
this analysis is to provide a closer examination of the nature of the shift in 
budgetary priorities in the early 1970s. For defense expenditures, several 
interesting contrasts emerge (Table 2): 
1. Again the statistical significance and negative sign on the error 
correction term for both time periods, suggests that defense maintains a 
long run relationship with the underlying economic base and that some 
of its short run movements are to correct for deviations from that longer 
run equilibrium pattern. However, as noted by the significance of the 
dummy variable for the entire period, the nature of this relationship has 
changed with time. 
2. In the earlier twenty-year period (1960-1980), defense expenditures 
appear a bit erratic, with a plus and minus signs on the GDP . This 
suggests an inconsistent stabiliz.ation pattern occurred, no doubt due to 
the conflicts with India during this period. Short run defense 
expenditures also expanded and contracted in line with inflationary 
pressures. 
Table 2. Pakistan: ARDL cointegration analysis of defense expenditures 
error correction representation 
Dependent Variable: Defense Expenditures (MILXP), 1960-1980 
R~ssor Coefficient Standard Error T-RatioJ!rofil 
MILXPl 2.459 0.589 4.17!10061 
MILXP2 1.987 0.685 2.90QL02_1l 
GDPDF 167.165 63.062 2.65QL03in_ 
GDPDFl 364.795 97.667 3.73~01Ql 
GDPDF2 125.705 86.331 1.45~1~ 
GDPNP 0.149 0.073 2.04QL08ll 
GDPNPl 
--0.575 0.143 -3.998[.0Q_7]_ 
GDPNn 
--0.549 0.154 -3.567.l:Ol~ 
GDPNP3 
--0.211 0.079 -2.672.l:03.1J. 
INPT 
-78.469 22.796 -3.44~0141_ 
ecm(-1) -4.426 1.074 -4.120[ .006) 
ARDL(3,3,4) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
MILXP = MJLXP-MJLXP(-1); MJLXPl = MJLXP(-1)-MILXl'(-2); 
MILXP2 =MILXP(-2)-MJLXP(-3); GDPDF= GDPDF-GDPDF(.-1); 
GDPDFl = GDPDF(.-1)-GDPDF(_-2); GDPDF2 = GDPDF(.-2)-GDPDF(_-3) 
GDPNP = GDPNP-GDPNP(-1); GDPNP1 = GDPNP(-1)-GDPNP(-2) 
GDPNn = GDPNP(--2)-GDPNP(-3); GDPNP3 = GDPNP(-3)-GDPNP(-4) 
INPT= INPT-JNPT(-1) 
ecm = MILXP + 36.2165*GDPDF -.14030*GDPNP + 17.1258*INPT 
R-Squared = 0.916; R-Bar-Squared = 0.667; F-Statistic = 4.4142[.041] 
Dependent Variable: Defense Expenditures (MJLXI'), 1975-1995 
R~essor Coefficient Standard Error T-RatioE_ro\tl 
MILXPl 0.438 0.183 2.38TI:03Q]_ 
GDPDF 
-66.160 14.446 -4.57~000J 
GDPNP 0.061 0.0182 3.364[:0041_ 
INPT -2.099 1.901 -1.10'!L28~ 
ecm(-1) --0.680 0.185 -3.666(.002) 
ARDL(2,1,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
MILXP = MJLXP-MJLXP(-1 ); MILXPl = MJLXP(-1) -MILXP(-2) 
GDPDF= GDPDF-GDPDF(.-1); GDPNP = GDPNP-GDPNP(-1) 
INPT= INPT-INPT(-1); 
ecm = MILXP + 10.0844*GDPDF- .090408*GDPNP + 3.0868*/NPT 
R-Squared = 0.737; R-Bar-Squared = 0.649; F-statistic = 10.'5275(.000) 
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3. In the latter twenty year period (1975-1995) this pattern is much clearer, 
with defense playing a consistent role in offsetting inflationary 
pressures. 
For non-defense expenditures (Table 3) 
1. As with defense, a long run pattern exists with economic activity for 
each of the periods (1960-1980, 1975-1995). However, shorter run 
movements in expenditures in the earlier period are not clearly 
associated with any systematic stabilization effort. Specifically, the 
varying signs for the lagged values of GDP and inflation suggest that 
the government may have altered whatever stabilization function it had 
assigned to non-defense allocations. 
2. In the latter period, however the pattern observed for the period as a 
whole again emerges, except that the positive link between the GDP 
deflator and non-defense expenditures is significant at only the 90% 
level. As with the period as a whole, non-defense expenditures do not 
play an important role in. offsetting movements in either GDP or 
inflation. 
6. Conclusions 
Historically, conventional wisdom has assumed that political/strategic 
factors dominate year-to-year variations in Third World military 
expenditures. Recent empirical studies, however, have suggested that 
economic variables may play an important, if not dominant, role in 
structuring budgetary allocations to the military. The findings presented 
above lend some support to this view. In particular Pakistan exhibits long 
intervals during which defense moves in line with resource availability. 
While year to year security needs must account for some of the shorter run 
movements in defense, it is clear that these too are controlled by the 
economic environment. The first can be attributed to a budgetary adjustment 
mechanism to control for over or undershooting of defense with the 
underlying economic base. The second reflects the use of defense as a 
stabilization tool, especially during periods of relative peace with India. This 
interpretation is consistent with the earlier finding that defense had a negative 
impact on the economy during the periods of conflict, shifting to a positive 
stimulus during more peaceful times. 
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Table 3. Pakistan: ARDL cointegration analysis of non-defense expenditures error 
correction representation 
Dependent Variable: Defense Expenditures (MJLXP), 1960-1980 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Rati@olil_ 
NJLXPl 3.110 1.355 2.29'!f:08~ 
NILXP2 2.644 1.161 2.277_108.5}_ 
NILXP3 1.204 0.768 1.5 66_1: 19zj_ 
GDPDF 
-601.123 205.860 -2.920_L04TI 
GDPDFl 7.345 136.361 0.053_1960}_ 
GDPDFl 
-19.137 138.142 -0.138J:897] 
GDPDF3 244.005 155.203 1.572ll9i_I 
GDP NP 0.646 0.178 3.630_1:02~ 
GDPNPl 0.141 0.116 t.215_L29U 
GDPNn 0.047 0.145 o.321!:76Ql 
GDPNP3 
-0.143 0.150 -0.948_L3ffi 
INPT -90.885 49.449 -1.837_1140}_ 
ecm(-1) ' -4.495 1.712 -2.624(.059] 
ARDL(4,4,4) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
NILXP=NILXP-NJLXP(-1); NILXPI =NILXP(-1)-NILXP(-2); 
NILXn =NJLXP(-2)-NILXP(-3)-,NJLXP3 = NILXP(-3)-NILXP(-4); 
GDPDF= GDPDF-GDPDF(-1); GDPDFl = GDPDF(-l)-GDPDF(-2) 
GDPDFl = GDPDF(-2)-GDPDF(-3); GDPDF3 = GDPDF(-3)-GDPDF(-4) 
GDPNP = GDPNP-GDPNP(-1); GDPNPl = GDPNP(-l)-GDPNP(-2) 
GDPNn = GDPNP(-2)-GDPNP(-3); GDPNP3 = GDPNP(-3)-GDPNP(-4) 
INPT= INPT-INPT(-1); 
ecm = NILXP + 46.4321 *GDPDF -.19615*GDPNP + 20.2158*INPT 
R-Squared = 0.961; R-Bar-Squared = 0.694 F-statistic = 4.193(.089] 
Dependent Variable: Non-Defense Expenditures (NILXP), 1975-1995 
R~ssor Coefficient Standard Error T-Rati~o~ 
GDPDF 132.472 72.761 1.820L086J 
GDP NP 0.208 0.050 4.110Iooi_I 
INPT 
-40.936 11.015 -3.71~00'.ll 
ecm(-1) 
-0.629 0.183 -3.422(.003] 
ARDL(l,1,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
NILXP=NJLXP-NILXP(-1); GDPDF= GDPDF-GDPDF(-1) 
GDPNP= GDPNP-GDPNP(-1); INPT= INPT-INPT(-1) 
ecm = NILXP + 90.5486*GDPDF-.33I12*GDPNP + 65.0014*INPT 
R-~uared = 0.558; R-Bar-~uared = 0.448; F-statistic = 6.74~0031 
-.-
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Finally one can only speculate as to why defense and not non-defense 
expenditures have been utilized by the authorities as a stabiliz.ation tool. One 
explanation is that defense is more discretionary in that procurements can be 
postponed or speeded up as the need arises. Non defense expenditures on the 
other hand, especially in areas like health, education and the like are longer 
run commitments and therefore difficult to expand and contract in the shorter 
term. Another explanation is that the diversity of non-defense expenditures 
might mask any pattern for the category as a whole. This would be a 
productive area to examine for future research. 
On the other hand, it appears that during non-arms race periods defense 
expenditures may be carefully controlled by the government, both as a means 
of avoiding fiscal stress and also for purposes of economic stabiliz.ation. If 
this is in fact the case, defense expenditures might be expected to actually 
produce a positive stimulus to the country's economic expansion. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines Pakistani defense expenditures from the perspective of 
whether that country's a/locations to the military have responded to economic 
conditions and if so has this response been to offset fluctuations in GDP and/or 
inflationary pressures? The main findings suggest that Pakistan experiences long 
intervals during which defense expenditures move in line with resource availability. 
While year to year security needs must account for some of the shorter run 
movements in defense, it is clear that these too are controlled by the economic 
environment. The first can be attributed to the budgetary adjustment mechanism to 
control for over or undershooting of defense with the underlying economic base. The 
second reflects the use of defense as a stabilization tool, especially during periods of 
relative peace with India. This interpretation is consistent with the earlier finding 
that defense had a negative impact on the economy during the periods of conflicts, 
shifting to a positive stimulus during more peaceful times. 
JEL classification: E6, El, E3 
Keywords: Pakistan, stabilization, defense expenditurts 
